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The growing prominence of computers in contemporary life, often seemingly with minds 
of their own, invites rethinking the question of moral responsibility.  Eurotransplant is a highly 
computerized system that generates priority lists of recipients for organs on the basis of 
compatibility, age, waiting time, distance between donor and recipient, and balance among the 
several participating countries (Tufts 1996:1326).  Ethical considerations are clearly involved, 
for Eurotransplant seeks to achieve “an optimal proportion between justice and efficiency—the 
medical ethical criteria,” and it is generally thought that it realizes these objectives better than 
previous procedures that relied entirely on human evaluations (De Meester, Persijn, Claas and 
Frei 2000:333).  Where does the moral responsibility for the priorities generated by the 
computerized system lie:  with the human programmers and users alone, or also with the 
databases and computer hardware and software?   
It does not seem controversial to say that the moral responsibility for an act lies with the 
subject that carried it out.  Thus our question about Eurotransplant raises the further question, 
what is the subject?  This question has no absolute, definitive answer because the subject is a 
social construct that varies cross-culturally and historically.  For some time the subject has been 
understood in our society to be the human individual.  From that perspective, moral 
responsibility involved in Eurotransplant, or anything else, is limited to the humans involved.  
“After all,” it might be said, “if something goes wrong, we don’t punish the computers.”  True 
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enough.  But we very well may blame them, and blaming, no less than punishing, is generally 
taken to be a marker of moral responsibility.  This gives a glimpse of the possibility that moral 
responsibility might include things beyond human individuals.  But if there is to be such a thing, 
it must be grounded in a different concept of the subject.  Recent social theory has proposed a 
way of thinking about the subject that is indeed conducive to a broader concept of moral 
responsibility.  The purpose of this essay is to review that alternative view of the subject, to 
imagine what a concept of responsibility derived from it might look like, and to consider what 
advantages it might bring and the objections that are sure to be raised against it.1   
Individualism and extended agency  
The view of the subject as only the human individual is known as methodological 
individualism.  This theory holds that subjects are human beings entirely contained in their “skin 
bags” (Clark 2003), that maintain their identity and integrity over time and in their various 
dealings with other individuals and things of all sorts.  Computers, other machines, tools, and 
animals on this view are understood as no more than objects that people encounter and 
manipulate in the course of their actions (Flew 1995, Jones 2000).  An alternative view that has 
recently come on the theoretical scene goes under names such as extended agency, actor-network 
theory, distributed cognition, and cyborg.  It maintains that most actions are undertaken by 
subjects that extend beyond the human individual to include other human beings and any number 
or kind of nonhuman entities (Clark 2003; Hanson 2004, 2007; Hutchins 1995, Haraway 1991, 
Law 1999; Selinger and Engström 2007).   
A student looks up a book in a library’s online catalog.  The methodological individualist 
insists that the subject in this case—the agent that carries out the task—is the student alone.  
Extended agency theory holds that the deed is accomplished by the combined entity consisting of 
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the student, the database of library holdings, and the automated hardware and software that put 
the two in contact.  The basic reasoning behind this extension of agency beyond the individual is 
that if an action can be accomplished only with the collusion of a variety of human and 
nonhuman participants, then the subject or agency that carries out the action cannot be limited to 
the human component but must consist of all of them.  The essential participation of nonhuman 
elements in high-tech applications such as Eurotransplant, robotic assembly lines or MRI 
procedures is especially clear.  However, it is obvious that many activities—herding sheep with 
dogs, mowing a lawn, even driving a nail—require the participation of nonhuman beings or tools 
as well as people.  Hence, although the growing importance of computers has been the most 
important factor in the recent development of extended agency theory, that theory applies to 
actions of all sorts.   
What does this have to do with moral responsibility?  For methodological individualists 
the issue is simple.  Every action is ultimately attributable to human individuals, and whatever 
role computers, robots, dogs, lawnmowers, or hammers may play is ancillary.  Obviously, if only 
human individuals act, then only human individuals can be responsible for those acts, and that’s 
the end of it.  This view may be called moral individualism, the ethical twin of methodological 
individualism.  When methodological individualist assumptions are deeply rooted, the mind is 
closed to any alternative to moral individualism.   
If, however, one is open to extended agency theory’s redefinition of the nature of acting 
subjects, then one can at least entertain the idea that responsibility may apply to nonhuman as 
well as human beings.  This view may be called joint responsibility.  Given the traditional 
dominance of individualism, both methodological and moral, extended agency as a theory of 
action requires something of a paradigm shift in conventional ways of thinking.  And the notion 
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of joint responsibility demands even more, for many people find it counterintuitive to attribute 
moral responsibility to objects, animals, and other nonhuman things.  To entertain the plausibility 
of such a paradigm shift requires closer consideration of the evidence and how it might be 
construed.  Because moral individualism and joint responsibility are corollaries of the competing 
moral individualist and extended agency theories of action, first we will examine the argument 
for the subject as extended agency. 
It is no ineluctable fact of nature that the subject is and must be the human individual.  
The subject, as I have said, is a social construct, and a great deal of evidence from various times 
and places indicates that the acting agent is frequently understood to be something other than the 
human individual.  One common notion is that the things people do are often not of their own 
making but result from external forces working through them.  Possession by demons and words 
from the deceased spoken by spirit mediums are obvious examples.  The Sioux Indian Black Elk, 
who had powers of healing and clairvoyance, said:  “ Of course it was not I who cured.  It was 
the power from the outer world, and the visions and ceremonies had only made me like a hole 
through which the power could come to the two-leggeds.  If I thought that I was doing it myself, 
the hole would close up and no power could come through” (Neihardt 1988:205-205). 
 Explanations of action and responsibility for it are also often shifted from individuals as 
wholes to some of their constituent parts.  Contact-period New Zealand Maori often explained 
how their “dark intestines” would not allow them to rest until they had taken revenge for the 
death of a kinsman (Hanson and Hanson 1983:128-29).  Abraham Lincoln (1839) recounted the 
anecdote of “a witty Irish soldier, who was always boasting of his bravery when no danger 
was near, but who invariably retreated without orders at the first charge of an engagement, 
being asked by his captain why he did so, replied: ‘Captain, I have as brave a heart as Julius 
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Caesar ever had; but, somehow or other, whenever danger approaches, my cowardly legs will 
run away with it.’”  Closer to home, a Holy Grail in today’s biomedical science is to look 
within individuals to identify the genetic causes of behaviors and qualities such as attention 
deficit disorder, autism, intelligence, and many others.   
Of greater interest here is consideration of agencies that include but extend beyond the 
individual.  A widespread example is the corporate group.  In many simpler societies this takes 
the form of a kinship group such as a lineage or clan.  Moral responsibility lies with the group as 
a whole, making it appropriate to retaliate for grievances or injuries against any member of the 
offender’s group.  The famous feud between the Hatfields and the McCoys is a further case in 
point.  More common in our society is the corporation, a legal individual that is held responsible 
for what it does to or for other corporations, clients, and employees.   
The idea of the individual as subject is only a few centuries old.  Erich Fromm, following 
Jacob Burckhardt (1954 [1860]:100-101), held that the individual was born in the Renaissance.  
“Medieval society,” he wrote, “did not deprive the individual of his freedom, because the 
‘individual’ did not yet exist….[Man] did not yet conceive of himself as an individual except 
through the medium of his social…role” (Fromm 1941:43).  It is also a peculiarly Western idea 
(Ess 2006:222).  Confucius held that ‘‘persons are not perceived as superordinated individuals—
as agents who stand independent of their actions—but are rather ongoing ‘events’ defined 
functionally by constitutive roles and relationships as they are performed within the context of 
their specific families and communities’’ (Ames and Rosemont 1998:20).  The same perspective 
is found in Zen Buddhism:  “seeking after and grasping at a ‘coherent self’ that is non-existent 
from the outset only leads to a ‘suffering.’ The Buddhist idea of ‘codependent arising’ maintains 
that all things under the sun arise in a codependent relationship with each other. Nothing in the 
 6
world exists in complete independence and isolation from others. There is no such a thing as a 
solid basis that exists autonomously” (Nishigaki 2006:240).  And finally, one prominent 
contemporary theorist has suggested that the conflation of the subject with the individual may be 
on the verge of disappearing, even in the West, “like a face, drawn in sand, at the edge of the 
sea” (Foucault 1970:387).  
To think of the subject as something other than the human individual, then, is by no 
means unusual in human experience.  They have widely been considered to be extended agencies 
consisting of pluralities of human and nonhuman beings and constituted by the contexts and 
events in which they participate.  One can think of them as much as verbs as nouns, the doings of 
activities.  It is a notion consistent with physicist David Bohm’s view of the world as informed 
by relativity and quantum theory, in which everything is an unbroken flow of movement and 
supposedly durable things such as observer and observed are only momentarily stabilized forms 
of movement that form wholes for a time and then flow apart to join in new configurations 
(Bohm 1980:xi, 47).  
To bring this into the practical realm, consider the well known phrase “guns don’t kill 
people; people kill people.”  That is an absurd thing to say because it falsely implies that the 
possession of a gun is not pertinent to killing, or to the subject that possesses it.  Of course guns 
don’t go around shooting people all by themselves, but everybody knows that a person with a 
gun is a far greater threat to kill someone than a person without one.  Selinger and Engström 
(2007:575-76), following Ihde (1990, 2002), explain that human beings are changed when they 
use certain technologies:  a man-with-a-gun is a different being or subject than the same man 
without a gun.  Similarly, it is commonly said that some people are transformed when they get 
behind the wheel of a car.  Or consider the saying, “if all you have is a hammer, everything looks 
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like a nail.”  That is, the possibilities for action depend not just on human beings, but on the 
available means of action as determined by the relationship of humans with technology and/or 
other components of extended agencies.  The entity that acts—the subject—is the extended 
agency (person/gun, person/hammer), not just the human individual.   
The varieties of responsibility 
If moral responsibility for an act lies with the subject that undertakes it, and if the subject 
includes nonhuman as well as human beings, then so may moral responsibility.  Two versions of 
this point of view are distinguishable.  One holds that at least some nonhuman entities may have 
moral responsibility in their own right.  The other is that moral responsibility belongs to 
extended agencies as wholes rather than specifically to any human or nonhuman parts of them. 
As for the first position, several authors who address the moral implications of 
automation ask whether automated agents such as computers and robots can be morally 
responsible (Coleman 2004, Friedman and Kahn 1992, Schick 1997, Hall 2000, Sparrow 2004).  
It is widely acknowledged that nonhumans participate in activities with moral import (e.g., 
Eurotransplant’s computers) but the salient question here is whether they possess, all by 
themselves, the mental qualities generally accepted as necessary for moral responsibility.  
Prominent among these are intentionality, the capacity to act voluntarily, and awareness of the 
consequences of what they do.  Dennet (1997) and those cognitive scientists represented in 
Dietrich (1994) are more willing than most to credit automated agents with mental qualities such 
as these, and are thus more open to the notion that they are, or eventually will be, morally 
responsible.  But most thinkers are unwilling to go this far, and they resort to locutions about 
technological objects being quasi-responsible, conducive to moral behavior, implicated in it, and 
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the like (Johnson and Powers 2005, Johnson 2006, Floridi and Sanders 2004, Stahl 2006, 
Verbeek 2006). 
Possibly future development of automated systems and new ways of thinking about 
responsibility will spawn plausible arguments for the moral responsibility of nonhuman agents.  
For the present, however, questions about the mental qualities of robots and computers make it 
unwise to go this far.  Moreover, this perspective’s focus on nonhuman agents in their own right 
actually shares the moral individualist tendency to separate them from humans.  Extended 
agency and joint responsibility theory aims precisely to overcome that separation.  Peter-Paul 
Verbeek anticipates that when it is overcome, “ethics can move beyond the fear that nonhuman 
objects will…suffocate human subjects and direct its attention to the moral quality of 
associations of subjects and objects” (Verbeek 2009:255).  This enables recognition that 
“technologies play a fundamentally mediating role in human practices and experiences, and for 
this reason it can be argued that moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological 
artifacts” (Verbeek 2008:24, see also Verbeek 2009:257).  
However, while it is relatively straightforward to attribute actions to extended agencies, 
other knotty issues come into play when it is claimed that they are also morally responsible.  
Most important among these are the notions that 1) moral responsibility is associated with 
deserts and 2) it requires awareness of consequences and freedom of action.  These matters are 
conventionally restricted to human individuals.  But a case for joint responsibility can dismiss 
the first of these as irrelevant, and, as for the second, can argue that the joint responsibility of 
extended agencies is not only plausible but that it accords even better with certain everyday 
notions than does moral individualism.   
Deserts   
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A standard objection to joint responsibility by proponents of moral individualism is that, 
as animals, machines, and tools are neither punished nor rewarded for the activities in which they 
participate, they do not share moral responsibility for them.  The first response to this objection 
that a proponent of joint responsibility might make is to point out that deserts are not a criterion 
for attributing responsibility because the question of deserts comes up only after a determination 
about responsibility has been made.  Especially in cases potentially involving capital 
punishment, criminal trials are often divided into the determination of guilt phase and the penalty 
phase.  The first phase is limited to the question of whether the defendant is guilty of (i.e., 
responsible for) the crime.  Only after that question has been decided in the affirmative is the 
second phase of the trial convened to determine the punishment.  The punishment (desert), that is 
to say, is a consequence of an already-made decision about responsibility, not a factor in making 
that decision.   
The same pattern characterizes virtually all applications of deserts, be it in formal 
situations or in the give and take of daily life.  We consider punishment or rewards only after we 
have decided that what was done was bad or good.  In behavioral psychology, rewards and 
punishment are known as positive and negative reinforcements.  They are applied after a person 
or experimental animal has behaved in a certain way, positive reinforcement if the aim is to 
encourage future repetition of that behavior and negative if the aim is to extinguish it.  In all 
these cases, the decision about whether a certain form of behavior is good or bad, desirable or 
undesirable always comes before a decision to apply deserts of one sort or another. 
It might still be maintained that even if deserts are after-the-fact responses to decisions 
about moral responsibility rather than criteria for making them, deserts are still unique markers 
of responsibility.  That is, all applications of deserts occur when moral responsibility is involved, 
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and only then.  The rejoinder to that would be, in the first place, that it is simply not true, and in 
the second, it is not evidence for moral individualism because deserts are applied not only to 
human individuals, but to other entities as well.    
Deserts are often used in response to behaviors that have no moral implications at all, as 
when psychologists give treats or electric shocks to rats that push buttons they are being trained 
to push or avoid.  They are also used in cases where the behavior itself may be morally pertinent 
but the subject performing it is not considered to be morally responsible.  Children are routinely 
rewarded and punished for desirable and undesirable behavior before they are old enough to be 
responsible.  Owners constantly praise or chastise their pets (“Good dog!”  “Bad dog!”), give 
them treats to reward appropriate behavior, and sometimes subject them to corporal punishment 
such as spanking.  In the Middle Ages the animal as well as the human participant could be 
hanged if found guilty of bestiality, and bells that were rung to summon crowds to an uprising 
were flogged or destroyed (Ihde 2006:273-74).  People criticize tools, machines and other 
inanimate objects that are badly designed or made, blame them for poor performance, and praise 
things of all sorts that function well.  Yet, with the possible exception of medieval notions about 
beasts and bells, none of these—be it a small child, an animal, or an inanimate object—is 
thought to be morally responsible for what it does.2   
Moreover, the notion that the application of deserts supports moral individualism cannot 
stand because they are often applied to subjects other than human individuals.  It is possible to 
view punishments such as cutting off the hand of a thief or castrating a rapist as directed 
specifically against a part of the body rather than the persons as a whole.  In a similar vein, 
sharing much with Lincoln’s “cowardly legs” anecdote recounted above, Jesus said “if your eye 
causes you to sin, pluck it out; it is better for you to enter the kingdom of God with one eye than 
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with two eyes to be thrown into hell.”  The sentiment is important enough to be repeated almost 
verbatim in two gospels:  Mark 9:47, quoted here, and Matthew 18:9.  In both of these places 
Jesus also expresses similar attitudes about one’s hand or foot.   
As for subjects that extend beyond the individual, it has already been noted that 
corporations are held to be morally responsible, legally as well as in public opinion, for their 
acts.  They are praised and given citations, sued and fined or even (the corporate equivalent of 
capital punishment) dissolved for their misdeeds.  It is the same with those informal extended 
agencies that are ubiquitous in everyday life, which form spontaneously to undertake particular 
activities and then dissolve when the task is finished and their components reform in other 
combinations for other activities.  This is especially clear with certain kinds of negative sanctions 
that have the goal of breaking up an offending extended agency.  Conviction of reckless driving 
or DUI often includes suspension of one’s driver’s license.  When a child misbehaves with a toy 
by using it destructively or refusing to share it, a typical punishment is to take the toy away.  The 
conventional view is that the child or criminal is being punished.  But the problem emerges from 
the conjunction of child and toy, driver and vehicle.  If either component were lacking— the 
child or the toy, the driver or the car—the offense would not have occurred and there would be 
nothing to punish.  Thus it is reasonable to understand the punishment as directed against an 
offending relationship rather than a particular part of it.  While we tend to think that the toy is 
being taken away from the child, for large toys with fixed positions such as a sandbox or a jungle 
gym, the child is removed from the toy.  But what is really going on is that the offending toy-
child relationship is being terminated.   
The same principles apply, in mirror image, for positive sanctions.  What are appreciated, 
praised, and encouraged are, at bottom, beneficial deeds and their results.  These are often the 
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products of extended agencies rather than individuals acting alone.  Even when individuals are 
honored they often acknowledge that the achievements were possible only because of the 
contribution of other people, education, and other circumstances.  Frequently rewards are 
conferred explicitly upon extended agencies as wholes.  This is obvious in the case of 
championship trophies and prizes awarded to debate and athletic teams, but there are many other 
examples.  If a company decides to make a special investment in a given department or project, 
or a foundation makes a grant for an innovative educational program or for research, the award 
typically includes bonuses or salaries for the leading individuals, financial support for lower 
level personnel, and enhanced resources for office, classroom or laboratory space and equipment.  
The recipient of the reward is, in such a case, the department, school, or project team, i.e., the 
extended agency itself. 
To summarize, 1) the issue of deserts comes up only after decisions about moral 
responsibility have already been made, 2) recipients of deserts may be considered to be either 
morally responsible or not morally responsible, and 3) those recipients may be animals, 
inanimate objects, and extended agencies as well as human individuals.  For these reasons, joint 
responsibility theory holds that deserts are not decisive factors in assigning moral responsibility 
and certainly do not constitute evidence for moral individualism.   
Freedom of action and awareness of consequences 
Two people collude in a murder.  One provokes the victim to chase him into the street 
and the other runs the victim down with a car.  Neither conspirator could have accomplished this 
deed alone.  Everyone would agree that they are both responsible for the crime.  But it is also 
true that it could not have been done without the car.  Does it share in the moral responsibility?  
Moral individualists would say no, because the car has no choice of action and no awareness of 
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the consequences of what it did.  The reason for this is the presumption that only human beings 
can act of their own volition and know (or, to include negligence, should know) the 
consequences of what they are doing.  The criteria or awareness and free choice are so strong 
that when they are not met, even adult humans are released from responsibility.  People are not 
held morally responsible for acts they are forced to do, for consequences of their deeds that were 
completely unforeseeable, or if they are unable to evaluate the consequences of their acts (as 
with the McNaghten Rule that a defendant who was unable to distinguish between right and 
wrong is not guilty by reason of insanity).   
 Joint responsibility theory is in basic agreement with these propositions, and makes no 
claim that the car has moral responsibility by itself.  It diverges from moral individualism in that 
it attributes responsibility to the extended agency as a whole, including both the human 
perpetrators and the car. 3  
Awareness of consequences and freedom of choice, which indeed are limited to the 
human conspirators, are necessary but not sufficient conditions for moral responsibility.  It is 
also necessary for the deed actually to have been done.  If the victim in our murder example had 
not been run down, there could be no responsibility for running him down.  This was done by the 
extended agency that included the two humans and the car.  Given that moral responsibility 
cannot exist but for the action of the extended agency, it lies with the extended agency as a 
whole and should not be limited to any part of it.   
 This argument can be run in a positive as well as a negative sense.  Two people cooperate 
to rescue a toddler who had fallen into a well.  The one descends into the well, a rope tied around 
her waist, to seize the toddler.  The other, at the upper end of the rope, pulls his partner and the 
toddler out of the well.  Everyone would agree that both human rescuers are responsible for the 
 14
good deed.  But it is also true that the rescue could not have occurred without the rope.  Absent 
the rope there would have been no rescue and therefore nothing to be responsible for.  Hence the 
extended agency of rescuers-and-rope is responsible for the deed.   
 Obviously, the term “responsibility” takes on a different meaning here from its 
conventional usage.  It is not, however, that the conventional sense of the word is being stretched 
to include extended agencies.  The conventional sense of “responsibility” is defined by moral 
individualism, which is an artifact of the underlying theory of methodological individualism.  
Extended agency is an alternative theory to methodological individualism, and the concept of 
joint responsibility is equally an artifact of extended agency theory. This is the paradigm shift 
mentioned earlier.  To entertain the possibility of joint responsibility entails recognizing 
extended agency as a distinct theory of action.   
 Joint responsibility can also be anticipatory or forward-looking (see Johnson and Powers 
2005:100).  A father hands the car keys to his sixteen year old daughter who has just gotten her 
driver’s license.  He admonishes her that, as the driver of a car, she is assuming new and greater 
responsibilities.  In this usage, “responsibility” refers not to what has happened but to what might 
happen:  she might hit a pedestrian or another car, cause injury to people riding in her car, get a 
speeding ticket, and so on.  She is responsible to take proper precautions to avoid such events.  
But she can assume those particular responsibilities only when she gets behind the wheel of a 
car.  Here again, if the action of an extended agency is necessary for the potential occurrence of 
an event or circumstance with moral import, then the anticipatory moral responsibility should be 
attributed to the extended agency as a whole rather than limited to the human part of it.  
Intentions 
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Extended agency theory generates an argument for intentions that parallels the one for 
joint responsibility.  I will not develop a detailed analysis here, but simply indicate its main 
lineaments.  Intending, like forward-looking responsibility, is a before-the-fact concept that 
concerns what may happen rather than what has already happened.  To intend involves willing, 
but it is limited to activities that have a reasonable probability of actually being attempted, as 
well as a reasonable chance of being achieved.  It makes sense, for example, to say that one 
would like to jump across the Grand Canyon, or wishes one could do so, but no sense to say that 
one intends to do so.  In Salman Rushdie’s novel Shalimar the Clown, Shalimar is a highly 
accomplished Kashmiri tightrope walker.  His dream is to become so adept that he can dispense 
with the rope entirely.  He would like to do this, he wants to do it, and at one point in the novel 
he even does it, escaping from prison by running along the top of a wall and continuing to run 
through the air after the wall comes to an end.  But the reader can countenance that episode only 
by suspending disbelief, for in the real world it is not possible for a human being to run through 
the air supported by nothing.  Therefore, in the real world, Shalimar could not intend to do it 
because it cannot be done.  
Just as moral responsibility requires awareness of consequences and freedom of action, 
intending requires will.  Inanimate objects and animals can no more intend to do something than 
they can be aware of the consequences of what they do or are free to decide whether or not to do 
it.  Most important for our purposes, however, is that intention also shares the requirement with 
forward-looking responsibility that the act in question could actually take place.  If it is not 
possible, it cannot be intended.  If it is an act that can be accomplished only by an extended 
agency that includes nonhuman as well as human components, such as walking on a tightrope, 
the intention to do it lies with the extended agency as a whole.  It must include a human 
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component because that is the locus of the will, which is necessary to intentions.  But it must also 
include the nonhuman components, because without them the act could not be done, and 
therefore it could not be intended.     
Moral individualism and causal responsibility 
If pressed, a proponent of moral individualism might accept the proposition that 
responsibility extends beyond the human individual, but still insist that human and nonhuman 
entities have different kinds of responsibility.  The responsibility of the car in our murder 
example or the rope in our rescue example is purely causal (as, for example, high wind might be 
responsible for blowing down a tree) while that of the human perpetrators, who alone are aware 
of what they are doing and have the freedom to act otherwise, is both causal and moral.   
 It is possible to frame parallel arguments for intending, but I will limit the response to 
responsibility.  First, assigning different kinds of responsibility to different components of an 
extended agency depends on the ability to distinguish unequivocally between what the various 
components do.  Sometimes this is not difficult.  In our rescue example, the exact roles played by 
each of the two human rescuers and the rope are easy to identify.  But with extended agencies 
that include automated expert systems featuring decisions made by computers, differentiating 
tasks is much more difficult.  As Johnson and Powers point out, “the distribution of tasks to 
computer systems integrates computer system behavior and human behavior in a way that makes 
it impossible to disaggregate in ascribing moral responsibility” (2005:106).   
It is especially difficult to call upon initial human programming to explain the behavior of 
artificial intelligent systems that are the result of CAD-CAM (computer-assisted design, 
computer-assisted manufacture) and that can learn.  After a time such systems may develop into 
something quite different from their beginnings, independently of any further human input.  
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Consider Tierra, a computer program designed by biologist Thomas Rey to simulate evolution by 
natural selection.  He began with a self-replicating digital creature consisting of 80 instructions.  
Its progeny were designed to replicate themselves with fewer instructions, being selected for by 
using less CPU time in an environment where that is a scarce resource.  Over the generations and 
with no further human intervention, the system produced new, more efficient creatures.  Small 
parasitic creatures emerged that co-opted the features of larger ones.  In response, some of the 
host creatures developed immunity to the first generation of parasites, following which new 
parasites capable of penetrating the hosts’ defenses were replicated.  Rey, the original 
programmer, could not predict the developments that were taking place (Turkle 1998:321).  If 
any system with clear moral significance, such as Eurotransplant, incorporates machine learning, 
it would eventually become impossible to sort out how the various parts of the extended agency 
influence each other and what part of an action each of them does.  At that point the only 
recourse is to assign responsibility to the extended agency as a whole.   
It might be argued, however, that the difficulty in distinguishing what humans do from 
what computers do in cases such as this is purely a practical problem.  As such, it has no bearing 
on the theoretical or in-principle issue of where moral responsibility lies.  But practical issues 
often determine how various situations are regarded, and this is as true of individualism as it is of 
extended agency theory.  It is commonly recognized that an individual’s behavior is determined 
by multiple factors, including genetic make-up, childhood experience, formal training, and 
momentary impulse.  It should be possible in principle to sort out the particular contribution of 
each factor in a given situation, but this is seldom done because the task would be extremely 
complex, time consuming, and highly controversial.  Instead, moral individualists adopt the 
practical option of attributing responsibility to the person as an undifferentiated whole.  Cases 
 18
where the contributions of humans and computers to tasks such as predicting the weather or 
allocating donor organs are difficult to disentangle are no different. 
Second, joint responsibility actually accords better in certain ways with general 
understandings of responsibility than does moral individualism.  Recall the father admonishing 
his teenage daughter about her new responsibility, now that she will be driving a car.  It is 
possible that he articulated similar warnings several years earlier, when she learned to ride a 
bicycle.  “Be careful not to run into people or things, don’t crash your bike or hurt yourself, and 
especially don’t ride into the street without looking.”  Her responsibility with the bicycle is, 
however, considerably less momentous than that with the car.  Imagine now that she later 
becomes President of the United States and assumes the heaviest responsibility that any human 
being can have:  to order a nuclear attack.  Here her responsibility is infinitely greater than that 
associated with riding a bike or driving a car. 
We appreciate the different degrees of responsibility in these examples immediately and 
intuitively, but they are more readily explained by joint responsibility than by moral 
individualism.  If moral responsibility is restricted to human beings, then differences in 
responsibility must be explained in terms of human differences.  But in this case the woman, who 
continues to ride a bicycle and drive a car after she has become President, is a constant.  She is 
expected to exercise the most thoughtful prudence in all of these contexts.  Hence moral 
individualism gives no satisfactory explanation for the obvious differences in her responsibilities.  
Using the concept of joint responsibility, the difference is explained by recognizing that there is 
not one subject in these scenarios, but three.  More damage can be done by the extended agency 
woman-driving-a-car than woman-riding-a-bike, and a great deal more damage still can be done 
by woman-with-her-finger-on-the-nuclear-trigger.  When we recognize the responsible parties in 
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these three cases as three quite different extended agencies, we can readily explain the 
differences in the moral responsibilities they carry.  
Finally, the joint responsibility perspective encourages constructive, moral behavior in all 
contexts.  Under moral individualism people are isolated in their skin bags, independent of other 
things.  They of course have obligations to others, but the others remain, precisely, Other, 
ultimately alien from the Self.  In contrast, extended agency theory emphasizes the multiple 
connections between humans and nonhumans of all descriptions in systems of action ranging in 
scope from the immediate all the way to the global.  This is more consistent with recent 
emphases on ecological thinking.  When the subject is perceived more as a verb than a noun—as 
a way of combining different entities in different ways to engage in various activities—the 
distinction between Self and Other loses both clarity and significance.  When human individuals 
realize that they do not act alone but together with other people and things in extended agencies, 
they are more likely to appreciate the mutual dependency of all the participants for their common 
wellbeing.  The notion of joint responsibility associated with this frame of mind is more 
conducive than moral individualism to constructive engagement with other people, with 
technology, and with the environment in general. 
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1 This essay represents my second attempt to deal with these issues.  For the first, see Hanson (2008) and, for a 
rejoinder, Giere (2008). 
2 It is important to bear in mind that the concept of joint responsibility under discussion here does not advocate the 
moral responsibility of nonhuman things in their own rights, but only the responsibility of extended agencies 
consisting of humans and nonhumans taken together.   
3 Strictly speaking the agencies involved in these events include many components in addition to those specified 
here, such as gasoline to fuel the car, the weather, the conditions of the road, and so on.  There comes a point of 
diminishing returns, where the participation of some elements is sufficiently inconsequential (the make and year of 
the car) or so constant (the effect of gravity, the presence of oxygen) that they can be disregarded.  As this is a 
discussion of general concepts rather than exact allocation of responsibility for particular events, it considers only 
the most obvious variables of any extended agency. 
